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This paper models data for the Netherlands in the 1970s on prestige of 
male’s occupation, occupational prestige of the father and ‘left/right’ score 
of the political party he prefers. One set of hypotheses holds that 
individuals behave according to economic self-interest, another set 
postulates a status motive. The former specify additive effects, the latter 
interaction effects. It is argued that these hypotheses have to be tested 
with Diagonal Mobility Models. A result of their application is that an 
economic diagonal model fits best. 
This paper also discusses macroimplications of these models for 
individual data. To determine macroeffects of status models, it is necessary 
to ascertain the total percentage of mobile persons in a society. For the 
macro-application of economic models, the amount of mobility necessi- 
tated by a country’s opportunity structure is relevant. The latter is much 
smaller than the former. As an economic model was corroborated, 
macroeffects of social mobility on a society’s political outcome are smaller 
man might have been suspected. 
Introduction 
Baclzground 
In the 1970s and 1980s research within sociology on social stratification and 
mobility was given new impetus by large scale surveys in the United States 
(Featherman and Hauser, 1978) and Great Britain (Goldthorpe, 1980) by 
comparison between British data with data for France and Sweden (E&son et al., 
1983), and by a collation of the British data set with the US data set (Erikson and 
Goldthorpe, 1985). After a long lull, sociology in the Netherlands, the country 
focused upon in this paper, regained interest in stratification and mobility research 
(Bakker et al, 1984). All these empirical studies have taken personal characteristics 
(rank on the social ladder or position in the class structure, motility along this 
ladder or within this structure) and characteristics of countries (stratification, 
mobility pattern) as dependent variables. In this article these characteristics are 
focused upon as independent variables. We deal with their effect on the political 
outcome in the Netherlands. Consequently, this article links up with an existing 
interest in effects of mobility within political science in the Netherlands (Andeweg, 
1982) Great Britain (Abramson, 1972; Thorburn, 1979; Robertson, 1984) and the 
United States (Barber, 1970; Jackman, 1972; Knoke, 1973; Herz, 1986). 
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Hypotheses on the effect of a country’s pattern of stratification and mobility on 
the political outcome are various and some have had a long history. More than a 
century ago Marx asserted the existence of class struggle, a point that has been 
repeated many times since. Societies, like the European ones at that time, were 
supposed to be divided into two classes. Namely, the owners of the means of 
production and the people who sell their labour. The d8erent interests of these 
two classes result, accordingly, in class struggles. Later, social scientists divided 
labourers into blue and white collar workers and by doing so distinguished more 
classes (Geiger, 1932). According to other social scientists, struggles in industrial 
societies are seldom violent; they take the shape of electoral contests (Lipset, 1960: 
230). Nearly every survey conducted in different Western industrialized nations 
after World War II, shows a positive relationship between a person’s class position 
and this individual’s ‘right’ wing preference. One current explanation for this 
regularity is economic self-interest (Lipset, 1960: 239). 
From a Marxist point of view Parkin states, in an influential study from the early 
1970s that individuals from higher classes are a minority vis-a-vis persons from 
lower classes. Parkin also noticed that in England as well as in other industrial 
societies class-struggles were not settled in favour of the lower classes, even after 
the introduction of universal suffrage. According to Parkin this contradiction 
between Marxist theory and empirical findings raises the question of why the largest 
and least endowed group does not rebel more than it is presently doing (Parkin, 
1970: 48). 
A variant of this problem is the question of how it is possible that in nearly every 
survey in Western industrialized socities the relation between class and voting 
behaviour displays the same sign, but differs in strength. In the year Parkin’s study 
appeared, Lenski and Lenski ( 1970: 362) published data on the relationship between 
class and voting behaviour for nine industrialized countries during the 1950s and 
1960s. These data indeed show that in every country blue collar workers in general 
voted more ‘left’ wing than the remainder of the population, but at the same time 
they made clear that Alford’s ‘index of class voting’ differed vastly between 
countries. (Alford’s index is the percentage of left-wing blue collar workers minus 
the percentage of left-wing non-blue collar workers, see Alford, 1962). More than 
a decade later Korpi ( 1983) presented Alford’s index for 18 industrialized countries 
at later points in time. These data displayed the same patterns as those of Lenski 
and Lenski. 
An answer to similar questions, was given long ago by Sombart ( 1906). Sombart 
sought to account for the absence of socialism in the United States, where capitalism 
was most extensively developed. Sombart’s answer was fourfold. First, the economic 
position of labourers in America was more favourable than in other countries. 
Second, these labourers had more political power; third, workers were more 
respected in the United States; and finally, workers in America were more upwardly 
mobile than labourers in Germany and other European countries. 
After Sombart, social scientists primarily paid attention to consequences of 
upward mobility and other forms of mobility for a country’s political situation. 
Dahrendorf made statements about mobility ‘tout court’ and maintained that the 
intensity of class struggle declines if various classes are more accessible (less closed) 
(Dahrendorf, 1959: 239). Lenski stipulated the effects of upward mobility. 
According to Lenski the distribution system of societies is characterized by (a) a 
certain degree of inequality, (b) a specific rate of vertical mobility, and (c) a certain 
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intensity of class struggle. Based on the last two characteristics Lenski formulated 
the hypothesis that ‘the degree of class hostility tends to vary inversely with the 
rate of upward mobility’ (Lenski, 1966: 86). Parkin used the image of upward 
mobility as a political safety-valve. The importance of Parkin’s study is that it 
explicitly discusses downward mobility. The hypothesis is that political attachment 
of the downwardly mobile does not change sulIiciently to resemble their class of 
destination, but rather, to a large extent, still reflects their origin (Parkin, 1970: 53). 
These pronouncements lead to the hypothesis that, although greater inequality 
in a society results in a general move to the left, this move is limited by mobility. 
The more mobility between classes in a society, the more the voting pattern of 
different classes resemble one another, and the lower the total percentage of left- 
wing voters will be. This article is concerned with the relationship between social 
mobility and the total percentage of left wing voters (electoral outcome) in the 
Netherlands. That this hypothesis does not need to hold for every country, may 
appear from Parkin’s remark that in some industrial societies the number of 
downwardly mobile persons surpasses the number of upwardly mobile persons 
(Parkin, 1970: 53). For instance, if some part of a society’s population has been 
downwardly mobile, while no person has been upwardly mobile, and if Parkin’s 
hypothesis holds that downwardly mobile persons stick to the voting behaviour of 
their class of origin, then in such a situation the percentage of right wing voters in 
the lower classes will be higher than in a situation of no mobility, although the 
amount of right wing voters as a percentage of the total population remains the 
same. 
The hypothesis that mobility results in a shift to the right in the political outcome 
and the above mentioned hypotheses of Sombart, Dahrendorf, Len&i and Parkin are 
typically macrohypotheses. At Iirst sight this implies that for a test of these 
hypotheses it would be necessary to conduct comparative research involving a large 
number of countries. This, however, is costly and time consuming. Yet, macrohy- 
potheses may at times also be deduced from microhypotheses. In this manner it is 
still possible to test the aggregate hypotheses by means of a less costly and faster 
way, e.g. by using the underlying individual hypotheses. Such microhypotheses on 
mobility and voting have been frequently tested in the literature. 
The macrohypothesis stating that mobility results in a general shift to the right, 
may be deduced from several different individual hypotheses. In addition, 
macrodeductions sometimes require auxiliary assumptions. It is not coincidental 
that a more recent study by Andeweg on electoral change not only determines the 
relationship between mobility of individuals and their voting behaviour for different 
years, but also states how many persons in these years were upwardly mobile and 
how many downwardly mobile (Andeweg, 1982: 95-103). In fact, one of the lirst 
sociological studies determining the amount of social mobility in several industrial 
societies, dealt with the question of why there is no socialism in the United States 
(Lipset and Bendix, 1959). As already suggested, it is quite possible that statements 
about rates of upward or downward mobility are among the auxiliary assumptions 
necessary for making macrolevel inferences on shifts to the left or right in the 
political outcome from individual hypotheses on mobility and voting behaviour. 
Therefore, it is advisable to spell out these individual hypotheses and auxiliary 
assumptions before testing microhypotheses and before making macroinferences. 
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Individual Hypotheses and Auxilia y Assumptions 
The first hypothesis holds that upwardly mobile persons immediately become 
equally as right wing as persons immobile in the class of destination of these 
upwardly mobile persons. Suppose that three classes are distinguished and that 
persons immobile in the lowest class have a probability of 0.2 of casting a vote for 
the right, persons immobile in the middle class have a chance of 0.5, and persons 
immobile in the upper class one of 0.8. According to this hypothesis, someone 
moving up from the lower to the upper class would have a right wing voting 
probability of 0.8, as would a person upwardly mobile from the middle to the upper 
class. A person moving from the lower to the middle class, has a 0.5 chance of 
casting a vote for the right. 
A shortcoming of this hypothesis is that it only pertains to upwardly mobile 
persons. One of the current explanations of this hypothesis is that upward mobile 
persons vote for the right because of their new economic interests. When retaining 
this explanation, it becomes possible to complete the hypothesis on upwardly 
mobile persons by linking it to a hypothesis on downwardly mobile persons. The 
latter hypothesis states that persons moving downward immediately become as 
leftist as persons immobile in the class of destination of these downwardly mobile 
persons. In the above mentioned example someone moving downward from the 
upper to the lower class has a chance of 0.2 to cast a vote for right wing parties, as 
would someone moving down from the middle to the lower class. Someone moving 
down from the upper to the middle class, will cast a right wing vote with a 
probability of 0.5. No strict deli&ion of ‘economic interest’ is required for this 
argument. 
However, when the individual hypothesis on the immediate consequence of 
economic self-interest is accepted, and one wants to draw the macroinference that 
mobility results in a move to the right, quite specilic assumptions are needed about 
the marginals of a mobility table. To bring out these assumptions a digression is 
necessary on the difference between different aspects of a society’s mobility table, 
for example, between total mobility, competitive balance and social fluidity. It is to 
be noted that the distinction between social fluidity (cf. Erikson et aL , 1983) and 
competitive balance (cf. Ultee and Luijkx, 1986: 194) is akin to and an improvement 
on the older and, within sociology, still current distinction between structural and 
circulation mobility (cf. Heath, 1981: 255-7). We will now elaborate on this 
distinction between total mobility, social fluidity and competitive balance. 
One of the striking features of mobility tables is that marginals for parents’ class 
are not identical to marginak for child’s class. Usually less children belong to the 
lower classes than their parents. Table la is a self-devised mobility table with 
identical marginals and without any mobility. In Tables 1 b and lc marginals show 
less lower class children than lower class origins. Now if one is willing to regard 
these marginals as exogenously determined, one might say that in societies 
described by Tables lb and lc ‘the structure of opportunities’ or ‘the competitive 
balance’ is more favourable than in societies described by Table la. (If the number 
of lower class destinations is higher than the number of lower class origins, the 
structure of opportunities or the competitive balance of a society may be classified 
unfavourable). Any competitive imbalance, however, necessitates some persons to 
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TABLE 1. Father’s occupation versus son’s occupation; without mobility ( l.a), only with 
mobility induced by competitive imbalance (l.b), and with both social fluidity and mobility 
induced by competitive imbalance (1.~) 
Son 
1.a 1.b 1s 
LOW High Low High LOW High 
L 50 0 0 50 40 0 10 50 30 10 10 50 
Father 0 50 0 50 0 50 0 50 10 30 10 50 
H 0 0 50 50 0 0 50 50 0 10 40 50 
50 50 50 150 40 50 60 150 40 50 60 150 
be off the main diagonal in a mobility table. A favourable structure of opportunities 
logically induces some upward mobility (an unfavourable one downward mobility). 
Given the marginals of Table lb, it is impossible to assign frequencies to cells in 
such a way that a society without mobility is obtained. In Table lb all mobility is 
necessitated by structural imbalance. 
The majority of mobility tables display more mobility than induced by 
competitive imbalances. Despite their identical opportunity structures, Table lc 
shows more mobility than Table lb. That is, in a society described by Table lc, part 
of all actual mobility has causes other than a favourable opportunity structure. It 
may, for example, have been caused by the value climate of a society favouring 
openness of classes, which is a popular topic among sociologists. TO distinguish this 
part of ‘total mobility’ from mobility necessitated by competitive imbalances, it 
might be denominated as ‘social fluidity’. 
After this digression on the distinction between total mobility, competitive 
balance and social fluidity, it is possible to return to the auxiliary assumptions 
required for deducing macro-predictions on a society’s political outcome from 
individual hypotheses about economic self-interest which we mentioned earlier. We 
contend that, given these hypotheses, a society’s competitive balance does and a 
society’s social fluidity does not affect this society’s political outcome, and that more 
mobility is not necessarily accompanied by a shift to the right. 
That social fluidity, given a fixed competitive imbalance and individual assump- 
tions about economic self-interest, does not influence a country’s political outcome, 
may be illustrated with the help of Tables la, lb and lc. According to Table la and 
the previously mentioned probabilities of left wing voting by persons immobile in 
diEerent classes, the percentage of the population casting a right wing vote is: 
(0.2850 + 0.5*50 + 0.8*50)/150 = 50% 
According to Table lb this percentage is: 
(0.2’40 + 0.5*50 + (O.V(lO + 50))/150 = 54% 
And according to Table lc it is: 
(0.2*(30 + 10) + 0.5*(10 + 30 + 10) + O.S*( 10 + 10 + 40))/150 = 54% 
The second percentage is identical to the third one. Some playing around with 
other self-devised tables without any social fluidity shows that as a society’s 
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competitive balance becomes more and more (un)favourable, this society’s political 
outcome moves more and more towards the right (left). The results of these 
examples may be restated in more general terms. If the individual hypothesis about 
economic self-interest and immediate adjustment is true, a society’s political 
outcome is not intluenced by its total mobility nor by its social fluidity. A country’s 
political outcome is inIluenced only by its competitive imbalance or opportunity 
structure. 
This conclusion implies a qualification of the macrohypothesis, stated earlier in 
this paper, holding that mobility always results in a shift towards the right. To the 
extent that a society’s competitive balance is favourable, a society’s political 
outcome indeed moves towards the right. However, to the extent that a society’s 
opportunity structure is unfavourable, this society’s political outcome swings to the 
left. If a society’s fluidity increases while the opportunity structure does not change, 
this society’s political outcome will not change. Whichever assumption about 
opportunity structures and social fluidity in a society under investigation in actual 
fact holds true, is an attendant, yet by no means subordinate, empirical issue. It is 
important to note Marx’s prediction that under unrestrained capitalism the middle 
class will disappear and that the class of capitalists will shrink, is closely akin to the 
auxiliary assumption that competitive balances will become more unfavourable.’ 
The above-mentioned individual hypothesis supposes that the voting behaviour 
of upwardly and downwardly mobile individuals is immediately adapted to that of 
the class of destination. A second possible individual hypothesis also assumes 
economic self-interest, but does not postulate a quick adjustment. In this hypothesis 
an individual’s voting behaviour is seen as partially being the result of habit, and to 
outgrow a habit takes time. As a first approximation, the importance of habituation 
is supposed to be identical for upwardly and downwardly mobile persons. This may 
be indicated by means of a weight-factor a (0 I- a 5 1). On the basis of the 
previously mentioned percentages of right wing votes for persons immobile in 
various classes, persons upwardly mobile from the lower to the middle class will 
vote for the right at a rate of (a*20 + ( 1 - a)*50)%, and persons downwardly 
mobile from the middle class to the lower class at a rate of (( 1 - a)*20 + a*50)%. 
For other cases of mobility, readers may easily calculate percentages of right wing 
votes. It is obvious that the Iirst individual hypothesis of immediate adjustment is a 
special case of this second hypothesis. For the first hypothesis the a of the second 
hypothesis equals zero. 
Considering the second hypothesis, self-devised tables again show that only 
mobility necessitated by competitive imbalance results in a shift of a society’s 
political outcome, and that social fluidity does not. To the extent that competitive 
imbalances force upward mobility, a country’s political outcome moves to the right; 
and to the extent these imbalances necessitate downward mobility, it moves to the 
left. 
The Iirst and second individual hypotheses assume that only economic self- 
interest guides a person’s voting behaviour. In the literature, however, hypotheses 
referring to a different individual objective exist. In this way a third hypothesis 
assumes that a status motive (Lipset, 1960: 240 and 267-72) or pursuit of a 
favourable self-image (Parkin, 1970: 51, 54) is the ultimate aim determining voting 
behaviour. In this line of argument, upwardly mobile personsin order to display 
their newly attained higher status- will cast a right wing vote to the same extent 
as do other members of the class into which they have climbed. This status-based 
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prediction for upwardly mobile persons is identical to that obtained by a hypothesis 
of economic self-interest. An identity, however, does not hold for downwardly 
mobile persons. According to the status hypothesis, people are seeking a positive 
self-image. This supposition implies that downwardly mobile persons are reluctant 
to admit that they have moved down on the social ladder. Therefore, downwardly 
mobile persons will continue to support the right wing to the same extent as 
persons remaining in the class of origin of these downwardly mobile persons. This 
is a prediction contrary to the one made by the hypothesis on economic self- 
interest. When applying the same figures we would fmd persons upwardly mobile 
from the lower to the middle class voting for the right with a probability of 0.5, and 
persons downwardly mobile from the middle to the lower class doing the same. 
The contrast between hypothesis 1 and 3 may be summed up by Tables 2a and 
2b. Hypothesis 3 postulates, statistically speaking, an interaction effect (of origin 
and destination on voting behaviour). Hypothesis 1 only asserts an influence of 
destination and not an effect of origin. 
TABLE 2. Son’s political preference cross-classified by father’s 
occupation and son’s occupation; according to an economic 
hypothesis holding that mobile persons adjust immediately to the 
preference of those immobile in the son’s category of destination 
(2.a); and according to a status hypothesis holding that upwardly 
mobile immediately adapt to the preference of those immobile in 
the son’s category of destination and that downwardly mobile 
permanently hang on to the preference of those immobile in the 
son’s category of origin (2.b) 
Son 
2.a 2.b 
LOW High LOW High 
% % % %% % 
LOW 20 50 80 20 50 80 
Father 20 50 80 50 50 80 
High 20 50 80 80 80 80 
In order to deduce from this individual hypothesis on status motives the 
macrohypothesis that mobility leads to a shift to the right in a society’s political 
outcome, no auxiliary assumptions are required about competitive imbalances. The 
more mobility between a society’s classes-whether in an upward or downward 
direction-the higher the percentage of the population voting for the right. There 
is no need to construct tables to make this clear. This means that if hypothesis 3 is 
empirically tenable, in order to obtain macro-effects an auxiliary assumption about 
the total amount of mobility in a society is necessary . If hypothesis 1 is supported, 
an auxiliary assumption on opportunity structures will be sufficient to determine 
the political consequences of mobility on a collective level. 
A fourth individual hypothesis is now obvious: a hypothesis on status motives 
which abandons the supposition that upward mobility is immediately accepted and 
that downward mobility is permanently denied. As a first approximation, the ease 
with which individuals accept upward mobility is supposed to correspond with the 
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ease of denying downward mobility. This dexterity may be represented by a weight- 
factor b (0 5 b 5 1). In the above example (( 1 - b)*20 + b* 50)% of the persons 
upwardly mobile from the lower to the middle class will cast a right wing vote. In 
addition, of all persons downwardly mobile from the middle class to the lower class, 
(( 1 - b)*20 + b*50>% will cast a right wing vote. The third hypothesis is a special 
case of the fourth one (b = 1). 
With regard to this fourth hypothesis no auxiliary assumption about a society’s 
competitive imbalance is necessary in order to deduce the macro-hypothesis that 
mobility results in a shift to the right of a country’s political outcome. Again, an 
assumption about total mobility will suffice. Furthermore, if hypothesis 3 or 4 results 
in a better approximation of data than hypothesis 1 or 2, the macro-effect depends 
on a society’s total amount of mobility-if hypothesis 1 or 2 provides a better 
approximation, aggregate effects depend upon a society’s opportunity structure. 
Notice that the fourth hypothesis predicts that upwardly mobile persons are more 
likely to become right wing voters than downwardly mobile persons are to become 
left wing voters. This hypothesis has been advanced several times without making 
its derivation explicit (Stacey, 1966: 133; Abrahamson, 1972: 1292). 
The difference between hypotheses 2 and 4 is shown in Table 3. In this table a 
and b have been given the value 0.8. Note that hypothesis 4 predicts an interaction 
effect, and that according to hypothesis 2 the effect of origin and destination on 
voting behaviour is solely additive. Early studies on mobility and voting behaviour 
estimating additive and interaction effects are Jackman (1972: 214) and Knoke 
(1973: 1450-l). 
TABLE 3. Son’s political preference cross-classified by father’s 
occupation and son’s occupation: according to an economic 
hypothesis specifying a certain time lag (3.a), and according to a 
status hypothesis with gradual adjustments (3.b) 
Son 
3.a 3.b 
LOW High Low High 
% % % %% % 
Low 20 44 68 20 44 68 
Father 26 50 74 44 50 74 
High 32 56 80 68 74 80 
Naturally, it is also possible to state an individual hypothesis where downward 
mobility is as easily accepted as upward mobility. Since such a hypothesis disregards 
the former mentioned hypothesis of status motives, we do not consider it very 
interesting. This hypothesis predicts the same outcome for upward mobile persons 
as do the second and fourth hypotheses. For persons who are downwardly mobile 
from the middle to the lower class this hypothesis predicts (according to the above 
numerical example) that (b”20 + (1 - b)* 50)‘% of these persons will cast a right 
wing vote. Consequently, it leads to the same predictions as the second hypothesis 
and, because of this, is omitted in this article. 
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Given these individual hypotheses and auxiliary assumptions, the research section 
of this article is divided into three parts. The first part poses the question of to what 
extent specific auxiliary assumptions * hold for the Netherlands in the 1970s. 
Assumptions about the total amount of mobility and about the extent of competitive 
imbalance are necessary for deducing from individual hypotheses the macrohypoth- 
esis that mobility causes a shift to the right in a country’s political outcome. In the 
second part we ask which of the lirst four individual hypotheses mentioned above 
gives the best approximation on voting for Dutch data from the 1970s. In the third 
part, the microhypothesis providing the closest empirical approximation is linked 
with the auxiliary assumptions on a country’s total mobility or the adhering 
competitive balance, which is necessary for deducing a macrostatement about 
mobility and shift in political outcome. 
We contend that the relevance of this first, more sociological question has been 
insufficiently acknowledged in political science research. For instance, a recent 
study by the Dutch political scientist Andeweg presents percentages of upwardly 
and downwardly mobile persons (Andeweg, 1982; 97) but makes no distinction 
between total mobility, competitive balance and social fluidity (or any other 
distinction close to it). By failing to do this, Andeweg implicitly follows the way 
paved by US sociologists Lipset and Bendix (1959), as their study on mobility and 
the strength of socialism only computed the percentage of a country’s population 
having experienced social mobility. In a recent and well-known study of the British 
sociologist Heath ( 1981: 235) a distinction was made similar to the one elaborated 
here, but it was not concerned with the possible divergent influence of total 
mobility and competitive balance on a society’s political outcome. Therefore, in this 
article a simple3 analysis of mobility tables from the point of view of total mobility 
and competitive balance precedes a test of individual hypotheses on mobility and 
voting behaviour. For the same reason, findings on auxiliary assumptions about total 
mobility or competitive balances and on individual hypotheses are linked together 
in a separate section. 
Older Research Findings and Technical Ditlkulties 
Data on mobility and voting behaviour pertinent to the individual hypotheses 
discussed in the preceding paragraph, have been collected in many countries in the 
past. We discuss this body of research from the point of view of technical difficulties 
arising in data analysis, before moving on to the main analysis. 
Lipset and Zetterberg analysed data on West Germany, Finland and the United 
States about a decade after World War II. According to US data, people who moved 
upwards from the blue collar to the middle class turned out to be more conservative 
than those belonging to the middle class since their birth. It appeared that in Finland 
and West Germany upwardly mobile persons tended to be more leftist than those 
belonging to the middle class since childhood. According to Lipset and Zetterberg 
downwardly mobile persons showed the same behaviour in every country. These 
individuals voted more conservative than those who had belonged to the blue collar 
class all their life (Lipset and Zetterberg, 1956). Later on Lipset and Bendix obtained 
the same conclusions for Norway and Sweden as well as for Finland and Germany 
(1959: 66-72). 
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Referring to hypotheses discussed earlier on in this paper, it should be noted that 
the findings of these authors, obtained by making percentages of table frequencies, 
are not exact enough for a test of these hypotheses. One cannot decide between 
hypotheses 2 and 4, between a hypothesis specifying additive effects and one which 
specifies interaction effects. However, the findings of Lipset and Zetterberg do 
indicate that hypothesis 3, on status motives, may have been formulated too weakly: 
in the case of upward mobility there could be over-conformity (cf. Knoke, 1973: 
1451). 
This remark on the precision of findings still appears relevant a decade later. In 
a state of the art study, Barber reviewed the hypothesis that ‘for both the upwardly 
and downwardly mobile, political loyalties and attitudes tend to change in the 
directions appropriate to their new status, resulting in political behaviour 
intermediate between that of their old status and that of their new status’ (Barber, 
1970: 36). After discussing available data for the United States, Barber drew the 
conclusion that this hypothesis does best represent the behaviour of both upwardly 
and downwardly mobile persons. Because of Barber’s research a hypothesis on over- 
identification seems a thing of the past. However, the expression ‘intermediate’ is 
not exact enough to distinguish between economic and status motives, between 
additive and interaction effects. 
In the early 1970s Abramson found that for Great Britain ‘upwardly mobile 
respondents were more likely to support the Conservative Party than downwardly 
mobile were to support Labour’ (Abramson, 1972: 1292). Heath arrived at an 
identical conclusion based on new data for Great Britain almost ten years later: ‘The 
Labour lead among the blue-collar sons of Class I fathers is much smaller than the 
Conservative lead among Class I sons of blue-collar fathers’ (Heath, 1981: 234-5). 
Class I is the highest class in Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero’s class scheme, 
which is often used in comparative mobility research (1983). 
The findings of Abramson and Heath are stated in more exact terms than findings 
reviewed earlier in this section. Closer examination, however, shows that the 
findings are not accurate enough to decide between the hypotheses presented in 
this paper. These hypotheses not only compare voting behaviour of upwardly 
mobile with that of downwardly mobile, but voting behaviour of both high-level 
and low-level immobile persons as well. In order to test hypothesis 3, downwardly 
and upwardly mobile persons must be compared with the same category of 
immobile persons, that is, with high-level immobile persons. This is different, 
however, for hypothesis 1. When testing the latter hypothesis, upwardly mobile 
persons are to be compared with high-level immobile persons and downwardly 
mobile persons with low-level immobile persons. With regard to hypotheses 2 and 
4, for both the upwardly and downwardly mobile, both categories of immobile 
persons have to be taken into consideration, and according to the numerical 
examples presented for these hypotheses these categories are to be considered 
differently. 
Compared to other countries little empirical research on mobility and voting 
behaviour has been done for the Netherlands. Andeweg recently constructed a table 
cross-classifying voting behaviour and mobility, the mobility variable consisting of 
the categories upwardly mobile, immobile and downwardly mobile (Andeweg, 
1982: 99, Table 3.11). This table shows that upwardly mobile persons have a higher 
probability of voting VVD (the main right-wing party) than immobile, and the 
downwardly mobile show a lower probability. Andeweg then constructed a table 
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to connect mobility and voting, controlling for the respondent’s social class (Table 
3.12). This table led to the conclusion that downwardly mobile persons vote VVD 
to a greater extent, a linding which Andeweg eventually accepted. 
Apparently all immobile persons should not be massed together into one 
category, as Andeweg did in the first mentioned table. Certain difficulties might be 
solved by a table in which voting, class of destination and mobility are cross- 
classified. However, this brings about a new difficulty. The variables ‘class of 
destination’ and ‘mobility’ are logically related and it is well-known that such matters 
are to be avoided (see Blau and Duncan, 1967: 194-9 with examples from the field 
of social mobility). It is not clear why Andeweg offers no table cross-classifying the 
respondent’s voting, respondent’s own class and class of father. Problems with both 
Andeweg’s first and second table are avoided with the help of this table. Additionally, 
this table is frequently presented in the literature (see Abramson, 1972; Thorburn, 
1979; Heath, 1981). A ‘workbook on social mobility also regresses the respondent’s 
vote for a party on present class and social mobility (Herz, 1986: 140) without 
noting its doubtfulness. 
All studies reviewed so far looked at percentages with a naked eye. Doing so, it 
is difficult to distinguish additive from interaction effects. A more formalised type 
of analysis, originally employed by Duncan to determine effects of mobility on 
fertility (Blau and Duncan, 1967: 361~99), was used by Jackman ( 1972). This is a 
linear regression analysis, where voting behaviour is the variable to be explained, 
while origin, destination and a term for interaction between origin and destination 
are explanatory variables. Knoke (1973) applied multiple-classification analysis, 
another technique used by Duncan in research on stratification and mobility (Blau 
and Duncan, 1967: 128-40). Before Jackman and Knoke applied them, these 
techniques had already been criticized by Hope (1971). Hope’s main argument is 
that they model (procreation, voting) behaviour of mobile persons as being 
dependent on marginal frequencies, while this behaviour should be a function of 
main diagonal frequencies. In hypotheses about the voting behaviour of mobile 
persons comparisons between immobile persons (main diagonal cells) are made 
and class averages are not compared (marginal cells). These hypotheses postulate 
substantively quite specific additive and interaction effects, effects theoretically 
different from those in Duncan’s original models. 
Hope proposed so-called diamond models as a better alternative. Thorbum 
employed these in research on mobility and voting behaviour ( 1979). Sobel ( 1981) 
in his turn criticized Hope’s diamond model. Sobel reveals that its parametrization 
does not ft.&Y Hope’s contention that effects should be parametrized with respect 
to the main diagonal cells of a mobility table (Sobel, 1981: 895). Accepting Hope’s 
contention, Sobel came up with a new parametrization, embcdied in a so-called 
diagonal model (a specific type of non-linear regression). This model, according to 
Sobel, does allow for a specification of additive and interaction effects required on 
substantive grounds. No technical criticism of diagonal models has been published. 
It might be noted that although Thompson (1971) did not present a full 
formalization, Thompson-at this early date--quite clearly stated that voting 
behaviour of mobile persons is to be compared with voting behaviour of persons 
immobile in specific categories of the main diagonal. In fact, Thompson sought to 
implement this observation in an analysis of tables cross-classifying voting 
behaviour, respondent’s class and father’s class for five different nations. 
An example might help the reader to understand the substantial difference 
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between the diagonal mobility model on the one hand and the multiple classification 
model, also known as the square additive model, on the other. Imagine a 3X 3 table 
in which son’s voting behaviour is cross-classified against his own class and that of 
his father. In such a case the multiple classification model may be generalized as 
follows: 
Father’s class 
Son’s class 
I II III 
I ikf+fl +s1 M+fl +s2 M+fl +s3 M+P 
II A!f+Jz+s1 M+j2+s2 M+JZ+s3 M+.P 
III M+f3+sl M+fJ+s2 M+f3+s3 M+f3 
M+sl M+s2 M+s3 
Where the voting score of the k” individual (Ygk) is a function of destination (So), 
origin (&) and an overall effect M. In contrast to this model Sobel’s base line model 
for such a table can be visualized as follows: 
Son’s class 
I II III 
I u rv + p.u xw + p.u 
Father’s class II r.u + p.v V rw + p.v 
III KU + p.w ?tv + p.w W 
where u, v and w are parameters for the main effects with respect to the diagonal 
population means of voting behaviour. The off diagonal cells are defined as a 
function of the diagonal by parameter weights p and r. (In a later paragraph we will 
give a mathematical description of this model.) 
The first conclusion of this review of ditficulties in data analysis is, that in order 
to test the individual hypotheses on mobility and voting behaviour outlined in the 
preceding paragraph, tables must be analysed in which voting behaviour is cross- 
classified by class of origin and class of destination. The second conclusion is that 
those tables should not be analysed by looking at percentages with a naked eye, but 
by a more formalized technique of data analysis. Third, substantively specific 
additive effects in these tables are to be distinguished from theoretically distinct 
interaction effects. To full%1 these conditions for further research, this paper uses 
Sobel’s diagonal mobility models. 
Data and Construction of Variables 
Data for testing hypotheses outlined above, have been taken from the Dutch 
Election Surveys ‘Verkiezingsonderzoek 1970- 1973’ (Steinmetzarchive. nr. PO1 36) 
and the ‘Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 1977’ (Steinmetzarchive nr. P0354). From the 
first we selected the 1970 and the 1971 surveys. Surveys are referred to as KIES70, 
KIES71 and KIES77. AI1 surveys represent the Dutch population. Using question- 
naires, male and female respondents were asked about actual voting behaviour (or 
voting intention), father’s occupation, and own occupation (housewives were asked 
for husband’s occupation). KIES70 numbered 1839, KIES71 960 and KIES77 1856 
respondents. These three surveys were merged in order to obtain a reasonable 
number of cases in the categories which contain the most extreme mobile persons 
(total 4655 cases). 
Male respondents 2 1 years and older were selected from the surveys of 1970 and 
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1971. From the survey of 1977 male respondents 18 years and older were selected. 
The reason for making different selections, is that in 1977 the voting age was 
reduced from 21 to 18 years. In order to determine social mobility for female 
respondents, Andeweg cross-classified the occupation of the father of female 
respondents against their husbands occupation. It cannot be decided at this stage 
to what extent this choice is unfortunate. It seemed more prudent to confine the 
analysis to men only. This decision reduced the number of cases by half. Finally, 
there were more missing values in KIES77 than in KIES70 and KIES71. The probable 
cause lies in the wording of the questions involved. In 1970/71 the percentage of 
missing observations was 20, in 1977 it was 27. The final result is that of the original 
4655 cases 1585 are suitable for our analysis. 
Measurement of Independen t Variables 
In the three questionnaires occupational titles of sons and fathers were coded 
according to the CBS four digit classification of occupations. These codes have been 
recorded into Van Tulder’s (1962) occupational prestige scale counting six 
categories.* Andeweg’s scale, which consists of five economic classes, might have 
been an alternative for this occupational prestige scale. We consider that when 
hypotheses on status motives, using occupational titles coded according to 
occupational prestige, do not pass empirical tests, this is more telling than when 
these hypotheses do not pass tests when occupational titles merged into economic 
classes are used. By choosing Van Tulder’s occupational prestige scale, closer 
relations are also established with research on social mobility in the Netherlands 
(Ganzeboom and de Graaf, 1984). If a classification of occupational titles into 
economic classes is to be used, it is worthwhile to link up with international 
developments by employing the classification of Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocar- 
ero (1983). A disadvantage of EGP’s class scheme is that these economic classes do 
not form one ranking order.5 For this reason it is diflicult to regard forms of mobility 
as upward or downward. Therefore, Van Tulder’s occupational prestige scale was 
chosen. 
Van Tulder’s scale consists of the following six categories (given in reverse order): 
VI. Mainly learned professions, managing directors of large firms, secondary 
school teachers, highest-ranking civil servants. 
V. - Mainly higher-level employees, managing directors of small firms, high-level 
civil servants, large farmers and market-gardeners, intermediate technicians. 
IV. Mainly large shopkeepers, middle-level employees, middle-sized farmers and 
market-gardeners, middle-level civil servants and employees. 
III. Mainly small shopkeepers; skilled labourers, small farmers and market- 
gardeners, lower-level civil servants and employees. 
II. Mainly semi-skilled labourers, subordinate service personnel. 
I. Mainly unskilled labourers. 
Measurement of the Dependent Variable 
Several problems arose in measuring the dependent variable. First, all three available 
surveys do not provide identical indicators. In KIES70 and KIES71, respondents 
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were asked which party they would vote for if there were Second Chamber 
elections. In KIES77 respondents were asked how they actually voted in the last 
Second Chamber elections. 
In earlier sections of this article, the dependent variable of the individual 
hypothesis to be tested, was indicated rather unrefined as voting behaviour. In this 
respect it is important to note that the background of the hypothesis to be tested, 
does not give cause for the assumption that mobility divergently does effect actual 
voting behaviour and voting intention. This implies that employment of somewhat 
different measures is not objectionable beforehand. 
A second difficulty with the dependent variable is typically Dutch. British and US 
political scientists have been able to assume the existence of two political parties, 
while analysing data for their countries. This simplifies analysis to a high extent. 
For the Netherlands, a country with a multi-party system, an analogous analysis 
might be ventured based on percentages of VVD-voters (the main right wing party) 
or percentages of PvdA-voters (the main left wing party), but this would leave out 
too many parties and votes. Therefore, various Dutch political parties have been 
given a score on a seven-points left-right scale. These scores were taken from 
specific empirical research, indicating which idea people have of political parties 
(van der Eijk and Niemoller, 1983: 249). For restoring political party preferences 
from the 1970 and 1971 surveys, party-scores from 1974 were chosen (these scores 
were nearest in time); for recoding I977 voting behaviour, party-scores from I976 
were used. The positions of the various political parties on these seven-point scales 
are given in Table 4. Scores do not differ much from year to year. No data are 
available in all three surveys on left-right scores, which persons ascribe to 
themselves. 
A third difficulty concerns the mergers between parties. Data on voting behaviour 
in the surveys of 1970 and 1971 refer to the three main Christian parties separately 
and have been recorded to left-right scores accordingly. On the other hand, the 
1977 data refer to the CDA party, the combination of the three main Christian 
parties. 
TABLE 4. Positions of various Dutch political parties on a seven- 
point left-right scale (the higher the score, the more right wing 
the party is) in 1974 and 1976 
Political party November 1974 February 1976 
CPN 1.62 1.58 
PSP 2.49 2.21 
PvdA 2.46 2.28 
PPR 2.74 2.50 
D’66 3.18 3.29 
DS’70 4.01 3.93 
BP 4.99 5.01 
KVP 4.90 4.90 
ARP 5.12 4.97 
CHU 5.52 5.52 
CDA 4.84 4.99 
VVD 5.05 5.31 
GPV 6.00 6.17 
SGP 5.93 6.05 
NAN DIRK DE GRAAF AND WOUT ULTEE 123 
The main table to be analysed in this paper presents average voting for each 
combination of origin and destination with help of the above-mentioned left-right 
scale (Table 5). Absolute numbers in brackets of this three-dimensional table refer 
to frequencies of a two-dimensional table cross-classifying occupational prestige of 
fathers and sons. These numbers in brackets, and their correspondig marginals, form 
classical mobility tables and will first be analysed in order to determine tenability 
of auxiliary assumptions on mobility patterns. 
TABLE 5. Average political preference on a seven-points left-right scale, cross-classified by 
son’s occupational prestige and father’s occupational prestige.* 
Occupational prestige of son 
I II III IV V VI % 
LOW I 
II 
Occupational 
prestige III 
of father 
IV 
V 
High VI 
N 
% 
2.227 
(6) 
3.865 
(31) 
4.024 
(22) 
3.467 
(6) 
2.460 
(1) 
4.900 
(1) 
3.729 
(67) 
4.2 
3.249 
(21) 
3.786 
(165) 
3.875 
(111) 
4.169 
(35) 
4.011 
(12) 
3.468 
(4) 
3.825 
(348) 
22.0 
3.151 
(29) 
3.945 
(180) 
3.895 
(267) 
4.303 
(78) 
3.751 
(37) 
4.343 
(16) 
3.858 
(607) 
38.3 
3.680 
(2) 
3.758 
(52) 
4.240 
(88) 
4.528 
(54) 
4.560 
(21) 
4.665 
(19) 
4.258 
(236) 
14.9 
3.483 
(6) 
3.996 
(41) 
4.096 
(63) 
4.456 
(28) 
4.581 
(37) 
4.662 
(23) 
4.264 
(198) 
12.5 
(0) 
4.146 
(14) 
4.355 
(35) 
4.684 
(33) 
4.514 
(25) 
4.068 
(22) 
4.389 
(129) 
8.1 
3.144 
(64) 4.0 
3.876 
(483) 30.5 
3.997 
(586) 37.0 
4.385 
YZ 14.8 
(133) 8.4 
3.885 
(85) 5.4 
4.000 
(1585) 
100.0 
*Number of cases in brackets. The higher a score for voting, the more rightist this vote. 
Results 
Results for Mobility Patterns 
First, we determine whether the Netherlands has more upwardly or more 
downwardly mobile persons. An answer is given in Table 6 (containing data from 
Table 5). It turns out that there are considerably more upwardly mobile than 
downwardly mobile individuals. 
Auxiliary assumptions necessary for determining aggregate effects of individual 
hypotheses 3 and 4, pertain to the number of mobile persons as a percentage of the 
total population, that is to say, to the percentage of upwardly mobile persons plus 
the percentage of downwardly mobile persons. The total percentage of mobile 
persons reaches 65.2 per cent. 
For the macroapplication of individual hypotheses 1 and 2, the auxiliary 
assumptions on the (un)favourableness of opportunity structures or competitive 
balances are required. In order to determine this unfavourableness, marginal 
frequencies of occupational prestige for fathers and sons may be compared (see 
Table 5). It is clear that the distribution of occupational prestige scores for fathers 
is dissimilar to the one for sons. Hence, there are competitive imbalances. 
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Computation of an ‘index of dissimilarity’ (the sum of the absolute percentage 
differences between similar categories from marginal frequencies for fathers and 
sons, cf. Blau and Duncan, 1967: 43) results in a value of 16.9. Competitive 
imbalances largely amount to forced upward mobility. Along with mobility induced 
by opportunity structures, there is social fluidity. The index of dissimilarity stands 
for twice the minimum percentage of mobile persons, whereas the actual 
percentage of mobile persons is higher. At least 8.4 per cent of all persons should 
be mobile, whereas the actual percentage of mobile persons is 65.2. 
TABLE 6. Immobile, upwardly mobile, downwardly 
mobile and mobile male respondents (% ) 
N % 
Immobile 551 34.8 
Upwardly mobile 617 38.9 
Downwardly mobile 417 26.3 
All mobile 1034 65.2 
Concerning the dependent variable Table 6 indicates that in general people are 
more right wing, when their status is higher. The main diagonal shows that people 
immobile in a higher status group, are more right wing than persons immobile in 
lower status groups. There is, however, an exception. Category VI of the immobile 
persons represents a low-flyer. 
Diagonal Models 
(a) Modelling Economic Hypotheses 
Sobel’s most strict diagonal model gives an exact representation of the economic 
hypothesis specifying gradual adjustment. This model, also called additive base-line 
model, is specified as follows:6 
Ug = p.U*i + KU. 
(a) i = 1,2,3,4,5,6. ; j = 1,2,3,4,5,6. ; k = l,....., nii; 
(b) p + r = 1 
(c) 0 5 p 5 1. 
In these formulas, yqk is the value of the dependent variable where there are k 
observations for the cell zj of a mobility table. Subscript i stands for status of origin 
and j for status of destination. The expression uii indicates population averages of 
the dependent variable for observations in cell ij of this mobility table. E, is a 
stochastic term with 0 as expected value. Expressions uii and z+ are population 
averages in cell ii (the diagonal cell for the origin reference) and celljj (the diagonal 
cell for the destination reference) of this mobility table. 
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In this model the reference value for immobile persons is Uif. For persons off the 
main diagonal, this model has two reference values. The first is the diagonal estimate 
of the ‘son’ category weighted by r and the second one is the diagonal estimate of 
the ‘father’ category weighted by p. Restriction b allows for stating parameter p in 
terms of + (p = 1 - r). Restriction c Implies that origin and destination are compared 
as comparable chances. A consequence of this restriction is an estimate of the 
influence of origin relative to that of destination. Parameter uil thus is a weighted 
average of two reference values affecting the left-right score of an individual. 
Parameter p indicates the influence of origin in proportion to the effect of 
destination. As r = 1 - p, r indicates the influence of destination in proportion to 
that of origin. The similarity between what we have explained informally by means 
of a simple example, and what is now formalized here, is clear. 
This additive base-line model enables a test of hypothesis 2. This may be 
illustrated by representing hypothesis 2 in tabular form (Table 7). In this table, 
specific types of immobile persons have an average left-right score of u, v, w, SC, y, 
z That is, u, v, w, x, y and z should be read as ull, uz2, u33, 2444, u55 and uti of 
equation 2. 
TABUE 7. Tabular representation of a model for political preference incorporating an economic 
hypothesis specifying a gradual adaptation of mobile persons to persons immobile in mobiles’ 
destination category 
I 
I u 
II r.u+p.v 
VI r.u+p.z 
son (r) 
II III N V VI 
r.v+pu r.w+p.u r.X+p.U r.y+p.u r..%+p.u 
V rwt-p.v r.x+p.v tzy+p.u r.z+p.v 
r.v.+p.w W rx+p.w r.y+p.u r.r+p.w 
r.vi-p.x r.w+p.x X ry+p.u r.z+p.x 
rvi-p.y tTw+p.y ?tx+p.y Y r.z+p.y 
r.v+p.z r.w+p.z r.x+p.z r.y+p.z z 
TABLE 8. Tabular representation of a model for political preference incorporat- 
ing an economic hypothesis specifying an immediate adjustment of mobile 
persons to persons immobile in mobiles’ destination category 
I II III N V VI 
I U V W X Y .a 
II U V W X Y z 
III u V W X Y z 
N U V W X Y z 
V U V W X Y z 
VI U V W X Y 2 
In Table 8 parameter p = 0 and parameter r = 1. This represents hypothesis 1, 
the economic hypothesis about immediate adjustment. In formularly form, this 
hypothesis reads as follows: 
yUk = uii + E+s; (1) 
u*q = u. (3) 
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It should be noticed that this equation 3 is a special case of equation 2, that is to 
say, p = 0. 
Parameter estimates of the model with immediate adjustment are shown in Table 
9. By means of this model, both average scores (for example average voting 
behaviour) and data on an individual level may be included. In this paper the latter 
method is chosen for every model (this choice does not affect results). Parameter 
estimates of the model with gradual adjustment are shown in Table 9 as well. 
According to hypothesis 2, the additive base-line model should have ab #O, or at 
least p should differ significantly from 0. In Table 9 d comes to 0.66 (se = 0.8). 
TABLE 9. Parameter estimates, degrees of freedom and 
Residual Mean Square of models for political prefer- 
ence according to an economic hypothesis specifying 
immediate adjustment (co1 1); and according to an 
economic hypothesis specifying gradual adjustment 
Parameter 
(co1 2) 
I II 
3.73 (0.16) 
3.82 (0.07) 
3.93 (0.05) 
4.26 (0.08) 
4.26 (0.09) 
4.40 (0.11) 
0.66 (0.08) 
2.93 (0.21) 
3.81 (0.07) 
3.95 (0.06) 
4.51 (0.11) 
4.36 (0.13) 
4.51 (0.17) 
df 1579 1578 
RMS 1.69008 1.65012 
This means, in the first place, that$ significantly deviates from 0. Second, we observe 
that the effect of origin is more important than the effect of destination, since f = 
0.34 versusi = 0.66.’ This finding for the Netherlands is in contrast with the finding 
of Abramson (1972) for Britain, Abramson found a stronger impact of destination. 
In order to compare the model for hypothesis 2 to the model for hypothesis 1, 
a standard likelihood ratio test is applied. For this comparison we computed the 
likelihood ratio L = (ti~pf7i2S~)N.~ Considering that -2(log L) has an asymptotical 
CZZZ* distribution, where r is the number of additional parameters in the general 
model, models may be compared. The test shows that hypothesis 1 needs to be 
rejected, because the baseline model for all tables presents a significant improve- 
ment (critical value when p < 0.05 for CHZ* with 1 degree of freedom is 3.8); CHZ* 
value with the same degrees of freedom is 75.9. 
Summarizing the result on the tenability of the two versions of an economic self- 
interst hypothesis, hypothesis 2, stating that individuals gradually adjust to their 
destination category, is the one to be preferred. However, it turned out that there 
is a strong habituation to origin and a small adaptation to destination. 
(6) Models for Status Hypotheses 
Just like hypotheses 1 and 2, hypotheses 3 and 4 may be represented in tabular 
form. According to hypothesis 3, represented in Table 10, r = 1 and p = 0. This 
results in the following functions: 
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TABE 10. Tabular representation of a model for political preference incorpor- 
ating a status hypothesis specifying an immediate adjustment of upwardly 
mobile to immobile persons in upwardly mobile’s destination category and a 
permanent hanging on of downwardly mobile to immobile persons in 
downwardly mobile’s origin category 
I II III IV V VI 
I u v W X Y z 
II V V W X Y z 
III W W W X Y z 
IV X X X X Y Z 
V Y Y Y Y Y Z 
VI Z 2 Z Z Z Z 
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(1) 
(4) 
(5) 
Representing hypothesis 4 is a more complicated matter. Restrictions are the 
same as for hypothesis 2, i.e. p + r = 1 and 0 5 p 5 1, and again various types of 
immobile persons have an average left-right score of u, v, w, x, 32 z The tabular 
form of hypothesis 4 is given in Table 11. Notice that, compared with Table 7, only 
TME 11. Tabular representation of a model for political preference incorporating a status 
hypothesis specifying a gradual adjustment of upwardly mobile to persons immobile in 
upwardly mobile’s destination category and a gradual loosening of downwardly mobile from 
persons immobile in downwardly mobile’s origin category 
Son 
I II III IV V VI 
F I 
p.lL.0 
r.v+p.u r.w+p.u r.x+p.u r.y+p.u r.z+pu 
a II 
t III p.u+r.w p.v+ur.w 
r.w+p.v r.x+p.v ry+p.u r.z+p.v 
rx+p.w xy+p.u r.z+p.w 
h IV p.u+rx p.v+rx p.ww+r.x 
p.XLy 
xy+p.u r.z+p.x 
e V p.u+r.y p.v+r.y p.w+ry rz+p.y 
r VI p.u+r.z p.v+r.z p.w+r.z p.x+r.z p.yL.z Z 
the downwardly mobile persons are given new scores for political preference. This 
is represented by the following functions: 
Yqk = uu + Egk; (1) 
uij=p.u,+~uii,ifi<j (6) 
Uij= KUii-t~U~,ifi>j (7) 
Results of fitting this model for hypothesis 4 are given in Table 12. Parameter 
estimates for the model reflecting hypothesis 3 are given in Table 12 as well. 
When computing CZZZ* values for a comparison of models represented in Table 
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TABLE 12. Parameter estimates, degrees of freedom and 
Residual mean Square of models for political prefer- 
ence according to a status hypothesis specifying 
immediate adjustment (co1 1); and according to status 
hypothesis specifying gradual adjustment (co1 2) 
Parameter I II 
s 0.64 (0.11) 
Ull 2.23 (0.53) 3.22 (0.20) 
u22 3.75 (0.09) 3.81 (0.07) 
G33 3.88 (0.05) 3.95 (0.07) 
644 4.20 (0.07) 4.59 (0.12) 
u55 4.16 (0.08) 4.46 (0.15) 
&6 4.43 (0.09) 4.47 (0.20) 
df 1579 1578 
RMS 1.67199 1.65344 
12, the result is: CHZ2 is 35.4 (1 df). This means that hypothesis 4 produces a better 
approximation than hypothesis 3. With respect to this comparison, hypothesis 4 is 
preferred. 
Finally, it is to be tested whether hypothesis 4 produces a better approximation 
than hypothesis 2. For this purpose, the Residual Mean Squares of columns II of 
Table 9 and Table 12 will be directly compared. This is possible, as the degrees of 
freedom are the same for both models. 
It turns out that the weak version of the hypothesis on economic self-interest, 
postulating a slow adaptation (hypothesis 2) stands out more clearly than the weak 
version (hypothesis 4) of the status hypothesis.9 
Conclusions 
In this article some current hypotheses have been tested on the influence of 
intergenerational mobility of individuals on their political preference. Two 
hypotheses started from economic self-interest of individuals. The first hypothesis 
assumed an immediate adaptation of the political preference of mobile persons to 
the political preference of persons immobile in the category mobiles have moved 
into. The second hypothesis was a weak version of the first and presumed a lower 
adaptation. An upwardly mobile person will not immediately become as right wing 
as persons immobile in the category of destination of this upwardly mobile person. 
Similarly, a downwardly mobile person will not become as leftist as persons 
immobile in the category of destination of this downwardly mobile person. 
In addition, two hypotheses on status motives have been singled out. These 
hypotheses made the same predictions for upwardly mobile persons as did the two 
hypotheses on economic self-interest. For downwardly mobile persons the first 
status hypothesis predicted that these persons would maintain the political 
preference entirely of their category of origin. The other hypothesis on status is a 
weak version of the first one and predicted a small adaptation to the category of 
destination. According to this hypothesis downwardly mobile persons would show 
less adaptation to their destination status than upwardly mobile persons. Statistically 
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speaking, hypotheses on economic self-interest postulate additive effects and 
hypotheses on status motives additive as well as interaction effects. 
For a proper test of these individual hypotheses, Sobel’s diagonal models were 
applied. These models include parameters for specific additive and interaction 
effects postulated by the hypotheses in this paper. Three Dutch data sets of the 
1970s were analysed. It was found that weak versions of hypotheses resulted in a 
better fit of data than strong ones, and that a weak version of an economic 
hypothesis was to be preferred over a weak version of a status hypothesis. 
To apply both weak and strong versions of an individual hypothesis on economic 
self-interest when explaining a society’s political outcome on the macrolevel, an 
auxiliary assumption on opportunity structures or competitive balances in the 
Netherlands is required. Since the Netherlands has a favourable opportunity 
structure, mobility might shift the Netherlands politically towards the right. As 
macroshifts, in the case of applicability of economic hypotheses, depend on mobility 
induced by opportunity structures and do not depend upon total observed mobility, 
and as total observed mobility is much higher than mobility forced by competitive 
imbalances, the extent of the shift should not be overestimated. 
The data analysed in this paper only pertain to the Netherlands. Whether in other 
industrial nations hypotheses on economic self-interest explain voting behaviour of 
mobile persons better than status hypotheses, or whether the latter explain better 
than the former, remains to be seen. Yet some speculation may be made on research 
questions of current comparative research on social mobility. 
The main sociological research program on comparative social mobility of the 
past decade is that of Erikson and Goldthorpe. In this program social mobility is 
conceived of as class mobility, that is, as mobility within a structure of economic 
classes. An elaborate argument justifies this choice for questions about movement 
between economic classes against an earlier choice within sociology in favour of 
questions on movements up and down an occupational prestige scale (Goldthorpe, 
1985). When comparing social mobility of nations, this program of Erikson and 
Goldthorpe seeks to answer questions about rates of mobility (percentages of 
upward and downward mobility, total percentage of mobility) and social fluidity 
(Erikson et al., 1983; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1985). This program not only deals 
with answers to questions about rates of mobility and social fluidity as interesting 
in their own right, but also sees answers to these questions as preliminaries to other 
questions. This is the case as the program, assuming that questions about the nature 
of mobility have been answered, raises questions about political consequences of 
mobility at a macrolevel (Goldthorpe, 1980: ch. 1 and 10; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 
1985). 
The upshot of this paper for sociologists treating voting as one possible 
consequence of mobility is that the set of questions of Erikson and Goldthorpe’s 
research program may be incomplete. As far as description and explanation of 
mobility patterns goes, this program intends to answer questions on total mobility 
and social fluidity, paying limited attention to questions about opportunity 
structures or competitive balances. Such a relative neglect is proper if mobility 
questions are taken to be questions about movements up and down a scale for 
occupational prestige. Indeed, one argument of this paper holds that if an 
individual’s voting behaviour is determined by a status motive, macroconsequences 
of mobility for a society’s political behaviour are determined by this society’s total 
percentage of mobility. However, Erikson and Goldthorpe’s research program seeks 
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to answer questions about mobility within a structure of economic classes. Another 
argument of this paper holds that ifan individual’s economic self-interest determines 
this person’s voting behaviour, macroconsequences of mobility for a society’s 
electoral outcome depend upon this society’s opportunity structure or competitive 
balance. Yet Erikson and Goldthorpe’s research program does not seek to answer 
questions about this aspect of a society’s mobility pattern. This incompleteness in 
the set of questions of Erikson and Goldthorpe’s research program might for this 
reason not be harmless. If it were to be found that voting behaviour of mobile 
persons in industrial nations other than the Netherlands is better explained by 
economic than by status hypotheses, this incompleteness amounts to a rather 
serious omission. A link would be missing in a chain of questions. 
This paper’s results have three implications for political scientists who regard 
mobility as one factor influencing electoral outcomes. First, that hypotheses about 
economic interest and individual voting behaviour yield predictions about the 
consequences of mobility differing from those obtained by hypotheses on status 
motives. Second, that diagonal models offer an adequate technique to test which 
one of these hypotheses is to be preferred. Third, that the distinction between total 
mobility (mobility rates) and the structure of opportunities should consistently be 
applied. If status motives determine individual voting behaviour, electoral outcomes 
depend on total mobility, whereas if economic interests are predominant, electoral 
outcomes only depend on the opportunity structure. 
Notes 
1. This hypothesis of Marx, however, is about intragenerational opportunity structures. 
2. The auxiliary assumption that a society displays more upward than downward mobility is 
more or less a restatement of the auxiliary assumption that a society’s competitive balance 
is favourable. This point will not be elaborated here. 
3. This case-study paper does not attempt a more complicated log-linear analysis of mobility 
patterns. Examples of this type of analysis are Ganzeboom and de Graaf (1984) and 
Ganzeboom et al. (1987). 
4. For extensive information concerning recordings of CBS codes into Van Tulder’s 
categories, see Ganzeboom and de Graaf ( 1984: 90). For the 1970/71 surveys a slightly 
new recoding has been made, since codings of these surveys were in terms of an older 
occupational classification. 
5. In the meantime a key for recoding Dutch CBS occupational codes into the EGP class 
scheme has appeared, see Ganzeboom et al., 1987. 
6. Diagonal models have been fitted by computer program BMDP3R. Within this program 
parameters have been specified by means of FORTRAN. 
7. One might think that the conclusion that origin is more important than destination is open 
to criticism, since religion, an important dimension within Dutch society, is not included. 
However, it appeared that when the diagonal model is extended with religious affiliation 
as a covariate (cf. Sobel, 1985) this does not change the conclusion that origin is relatively 
more important than destination. This result to some extent answers the question whether 
Dutch politics may be described by one single left-right dimension. 
8. Sobel’s proposal for a test of whether one model differs significantly from another runs as 
follows: ‘For such a comparison, one first computes the likelihood ratio L=(tis,&&~, 
where &sr is the maximum likelihood estimate of rms in the more general model, AS, 
is the maximum likelihood estimate of rms in the nested model, and N is the sample size. 
Next, the finding that -2(log L) has an asymptotic CHI’ (r) distribution, where r is the 
number of additional independent parameters in the general model, is used for comparing 
NAN DIRK DE GrUhF AND WOUT ULTEE 
the two models (Sobel, 1985: 705). 
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9. It is difXcult to decide whether the difference between a residual mean square value of 
1.65344 and 1.65012 is substantial, since the two models are not nested. However, it 
should be taken into consideration that, when comparing nested models, similar 
differences between residual mean squares are significant if the models were nested with 
1 df dilference. 
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